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INTRODUCTION

"It ought to be possible for American consumers of any color to receive equal service in places of public accommodation, such as hotels and

restaurantsand theaters and retail stores, without being forced to resort to
demonstrations in the street .

...

"'

In the statement above, President John F. Kennedy articulated one of
the most basic democratic principles. In 1963, however, the notion that
the law should treat all people equally was revolutionary.2 In response to
mass demonstrations demanding equality, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter the "Act.") 3
The public accommodations provision of the Act outlaws discrimination in many public establishments.4 Since the Act's inception, courts

1. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People
on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript available in John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum) available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/
Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03CivilRightsO6lll963.htm (emphasis added).
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 294 (1955) (overruling the separate-butequal doctrine instituted by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) after decades of segregation); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (adopting the "separatebut-equal" doctrine, which states enforced through the 1950s); see also Liza Featherstone,
Classroom Lessons About Segregation, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 2007, at C29 (reviewing SUSAN
EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL (2007) (book
review) (noting that prior to the Brown v. Board of Education decision, schools did not
provide equal education for black children despite "separate-but-equal" doctrine and commenting that inequality still exists); see also Samuel G. Freedman, Still Separate, Still Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at 78 (exploring alternative outcomes of the Brown v.
Board of Education decision); see also Michael Jay Friedman, State Dept.: Enlisting the
Courts in the Civil Rights Fight, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 1, 2007 (describing history and efforts
to overturn the "separate-but-equal" doctrine); but see Linda Greenhouse, Court in Transition: William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2005, at A16 (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist's memorandum asserting that courts
should reaffirm the "separate-but-equal doctrine" promoted by the Plessy v. Ferguson
decision).
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (outlawing racial discrimination in many areas of public life); see also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 678-79 (1995) (describing the role mass resistance and violence in
Birmingham civil rights demonstrations played in changing public opinion and ultimately
the introduction of the Act); see also Ron Ferguson, We Must Strive to Keep King's Dream
Alive Today, HERALD, Jan. 15, 2007 at 15 (describing the violent police response to demonstrators in Birmingham and President Kennedy's response of initiating the Act); see also
Lynette Clemetson, The Nation: A Nation Transformed: Inspired by the Speech, They, Too,
Had a Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at 412 (describing fear of violent retribution
against participating in civil rights demonstrations).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1427

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol10/iss1/2

2

Martinez: Justice for None: The Fourth Circuit's Decision in Denny v. Eliza

2007]

JUSTICE FOR NONE

have grappled with identifying what establishments qualify as public accommodations.5 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (hereinafter "subsection (b)(3)"), which covers places of entertainment, has general and
6
inclusive language that has been subject to the widest interpretation.
Courts have inconsistently interpreted the scope of subsection (b)(3)'s
"places of entertainment" provision.7 One camp reads subsection (b)
broadly to include establishments that the Act does not expressly list,
such as health spas and amusement parks.8 The other camp, however,
interprets subsection (b) rigidly to exclude any establishments that the
Act does not explicitly list.9

(2003) (noting effects of the Act on racial relations and that the Act marked the end of
some "institutionalized discrimination").
5. See United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 878 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a park as
a place of entertainment under Title II); see also Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health and
Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding a spa as falling under subsection
(b)(3)); see also Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1340 n.12 (2d Cir.
1974) (noting that Congress's goal of preventing public accommodations from racially discriminating is incompatible with a narrow interpretation of subsection (b)(3)); see also
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 351-53 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting
the Act broadly to extend the Act's protection to all citizens for equal enjoyment of public
accommodation establishments).
6. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (protecting establishments
like theaters, sports arenas, and other places of entertainment as places of public accommodation); see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969) (rejecting a strict statutory
interpretation of "place of entertainment" provision); see also Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 67
(adopting a broad interpretation of subsection (b)(3) in deciding whether a spa was place
of entertainment); see also Miller, 394 F.2d at 350-51 (noting that if Congress had wished
to confine subsection (b)(3) to places of exhibition, Congress would have worded the provision to name only places of exhibition); see generally Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 856, 863 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (adopting a narrow interpretation of subsection (b)(3)
to exclude establishments the Act may cover if located within another place of
entertainment).
7. Compare Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1969) (rejecting a strict textual reading
of the "place of entertainment" provision), and Allen, 341 F.3d at 878 (adopting the Supreme Court's inclusive interpretation of a "place of entertainment"), and Rousseve, 516
F.2d at 67 (interpreting subsection (b)(3) liberally), and Miller, 394 F.2d at 350-51 (applying a broad interpretation of subsection (b)(3)), with Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons,
Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (confining subsection (b)(3) within a narrow interpretation), and Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (interpreting subsection (b)(3) narrowly).
8. See Allen, 341 F.3d at 876 (holding a park to be place of entertainment under subsection (b)(3)); see also Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 65 (holding that the Act protects women's
health spas because spas are places of entertainment); see also Miller, 394 F.2d at
344-45(holding that the Act protects amusement parks because amusement parks are
places of entertainment).
9. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431 (adopting a plain language interpretation of Act to
exclude spas); see also Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (adopting a narrow
textual interpretation of subsection (b)(3)).
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals follows the latter approach) ° In
Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that a fullservice spa is not a place of public accommodation.1 1 The Court applied
a strict textual interpretation of the Act. 12 In so ruling, the Court under'
mined the Act's purpose of affording equal protection by adopting arbitrary distinctions between full-service spas and other spas.
This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the
Act's public accommodations provision in the Denny decision wrongly
constricts the Act's broad remedial purpose.1 3 Part I outlines the creation, existence, and debilitation of the Act. Part II describes the Fourth
Circuit's ruling in Denny. Part III argues that the Fourth Circuit wrongly
decided the public accommodations issue in Denny. Specifically, the
Court erred by imposing a strict statutory approach to interpreting subsection (b)(3), contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.1 4 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit Court's interpretation does not comport with
subsection (b)(3)'s broad remedial language. Finally, Denny devalues the
Act's purpose of protecting all citizens equally, regardless of race. Accordingly, if the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari, the high
Court should reverse Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., and hold
that spas do fall within the scope of subsection (b)(3).
II.

BACKGROUND

The landmark signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the crowning
achievement of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States." Hailed
by civil rights leaders at the time and marked with celebration since, the
Act became a standard vehicle for equality under the law.1 6 As time has

10. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431.

11. Id.
12. See id. (reasoning that the Act's textual substance omits beauty spas in every single provision and therefore Title II does not protect spas as places of public accommodation); but see United States v. Beach Associates, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801, 808-09 (D. Md.
1968) (stating that courts should liberally construe the Act in accordance with congressional intent to eliminate unfair "humiliation of racial discrimination" and inconveniences
incident to discrimination).
13. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (listing various public establishments that affect commerce as qualifying as places of entertainment).
14. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (rejecting a strict statutory interpretation of subsec-

tion (b)(3)).
15. See Michael Kent Curtis, St. George Tucker and the Legacy of Slavery, 47 WM. &

MARY L. REV. 1157, 1203-04 (2006); see also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King,
Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 679 (1995).
16. See Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action,
and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence,11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 14
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passed, however, memories of this struggle for equality have slowly
faded, while courts have recognized fewer establishments as falling within
the Act's scope.1 7 Considering this varied history, an analysis of Denny
requires reviewing the Act's original purpose, its text, and recent interpretations of that text by the courts.
A.

Congress's Legislative Intent and ConstitutionalAuthority

Congress passed the Act to restore social stability and to protect all
persons equally from racial discrimination in places of public accommodation.'" The Act was largely a response to bitter racial tensions plaguing
the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. 19 Racial inequities, however,
predate the Act and are no secret in American history.20
Congressional ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments marked
a radical shift in the legal and constitutional rights of former slaves and
their descendants. 2 ' After the abolition of slavery in 1865, Congress rati(2001) (celebrating and revering the Act as the most effective contemporary civil rights bill
in American history); see also Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Marks 40th Anniversary of the
Civil Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2004, at A16.
17. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431; see also Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 863; see also David
B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the
Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 678-79 (1995) (attributing a contemporary disassociation with the Act to the passage of time and to fading memories of human rights violations, indignities, and struggles for freedom in America).
18. See David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 671-72
(1995); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (guaranteeing equal
access to all persons regardless of race).
19. See Daniel,395 U.S. at 307 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7402 (1964)) (describing scenes
of police arresting national clerics and sending them to jail as proof of dysfunctional and
outdated public accommodations laws); see also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King,
Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introductionof the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646 (1995) (noting that all Americans watched disturbing
broadcasts of vicious police dogs attacking children praying on sidewalks, and other inhumane treatment).
20. See Hayward D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action: The Politics of State Action, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 847, 880-81 (1994); see also C. Ray Cliett, Comment, How a
Note or a Grope Can Be a Justificationfor the Killing of a Homosexual: An Analysis of the
Effects of the Supreme Court's Views on Homosexuals, African-Americans and Women, 29
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 219, 233-35 (2003) (outlining the historical

context of racial segregation from slavery through Civil Rights Movement of 1960s).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see also U.S.
CONST. amend XV; see also President Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation
(Jan. 1, 1863), available at www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/emancipationproclamation/transcript.html; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points:
Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-BasedAdjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1981
n.106 (2006) (noting that courts recognized racial equality after Congress passed the Reconstruction Amendments).
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fied the Fourteenth Amendment to embrace descendants of slaves as
equal citizens of this country. 22 The Fourteenth Amendment grants citizenship to all persons born within the United States and entitles them to
equal protection under the law. 23 However, states ignored Fourteenth
Amendment values of equality and segregated people of color for
generations.2 4
The institution of inferior status and different treatment of non-Whites
under the law generated several waves of civil rights activism. 25 Racial
tensions finally exploded into the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s
and 1960s. 26 Segregationists' violent responses to peaceful sit-ins magnified the humiliation that non-Whites endured. 27 In 1963, mass demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama prompted the Act's introduction.2 8
The whole world watched as segregationists violently attacked peaceful

22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting citizenship to all persons born in
United States, prohibiting states from imposing laws that would reduce privileges, and
guaranteeing all persons "equal protection of the laws"); see also Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 393-94 (1856) (Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment after the Scott v. Sandford decision, which held that descendants of slaves were not citizens of this country); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (officially ending slavery in 1865).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Brown, 347 U.S.

at 493 (rejecting the "separate-but-equal" doctrine that legalized segregation); see also
Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul De Sac of Race Preference Disclosure,79 S. CAL. L. REV.
1231, 1239 n.14 (2006); see also LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a
Pro-Localism Agenda on Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. Civ. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 97, 153

n.290 (2006) (rebuking an "immoral institution of slavery" and noting its existence until the
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment).

25. See Christopher Coleman, et al., Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation:
Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest,30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 663, 670 (2005) (referring
to the Montgomery Bus Boycott and noting that daily humiliation of the Black community
forced the Black community to mobilize); see also Joshua Zeitz, 1964: The Year the Sixties
Began: Viewing a Transformation That Still Affects All of Us Through the Prism of a Single
Year, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1, 2006 at 32 (recognizing that there were long time grassroots
civil rights efforts pressing for a public accommodations bill).
26. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs § 7:1 (3d ed.
2007) (1994) (noting the historical backdrop for the Act and the "forced separation of
races").
27. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a Pro-LocalismAgenda
on Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. Civ. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 97, 136 (2006) (noting the

impact that television had by showing images of police brutality and segregationists' violence against brave civil rights activists enduring such vulgar abuses).
28. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307; see also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646 (1995) (describing vicious attacks on non-violent demonstrators for asserting right to equality).
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demonstrators who were fighting for equality. 29 Televised broadcasts
aired images of vicious police dogs attacking praying Black children and
fire fighters shooting children with water cannons.3" The sight of increasing police brutality and segregationists' reprisals towards peaceful demonstrators outraged viewers. 3 This escalating violence and mass
domestic instability forced the federal government to take action.3 2
Initially, President Kennedy opposed any civil rights bill, fearing that
such a controversial bill would devastate the Democratic Party.33 In the
wake of national outrage over the violence in Birmingham, however, he
ordered civil rights legislation to be drafted.34 In response to bitter racial
tensions, social chaos, national outrage over widespread violence, and
presidential pressure (which was significantly enhanced when President
Lyndon B. Johnson assumed office), Congress passed the Act.3 5
29. See David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646
(1995); see also LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a Pro-Localism
Agenda on Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. Civ. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 97, 136-37 (2006)
(recognizing that Americans who had access to television but lived far from violence felt
abuses first-hand and noting television's role in producing "national outrage").
30. See David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646
(1995).
31. See LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a Pro-Localism
Agenda on Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIv.RTs. & Soc. JUST. 97, 136 -37 (2006).
32. See David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 671-72
(1995).
33. See id. at 645 (noting that President Kennedy feared the Act would fail and believed that congressional deliberations over such a controversial bill "could divide and destroy the Democratic party"); see also Michael Taylor, In the Civil-Rights Arena, JFK Was
Mostly a Man of Inaction, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, July 30, 2006, at K2 (noting President
Kennedy was reluctant to advocate for legislation and he only acted out of fear that protestors would ultimately respond to violence with violence).
34. See President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American
People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript available in John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum) available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/
Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03CivilRightsO6 11963.htm (stating the
need for civil rights reform); see also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth
and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29
U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646-47, 671-72 (1995); cf Faye Cocchiara & Myrtle P. Bell, Latinas
and Black Women: Key Factorsfor a Growing Proportionof the U.S. Workforce, 25 EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES INT'L, Sept. 21, 2006, at § 4 (recognizing years of civil rights organizing and
activism).
35. Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and
the March Toward Color-BlindJurisprudence,11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 21-22
(2001) (noting televised violence in Birmingham was impetus for President Kennedy to
persuade Congress to pass the Act). President Kennedy sent Congress a draft of the Act on
June 19, 1963. Id. Congress ratified the Act on June 19, 1964. Id. See also Jody Allen &
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Act is a remedial statute that outlaws various types of racial discrimination. 36 Specifically, Title II of the Act entitles all persons, regardless of race, to the equal enjoyment of the services and privileges of
public accommodations.3 7 A direct result of years of civil rights agitation,
the Act demonstrates Fourteenth Amendment values of equality by sanctioning racial discrimination in public accommodations.3 ' The United

States Supreme Court has recognized Congress's authority to attach these
values therein.3 9
Title II opens with subsection (a), which describes both the type of conduct the Act prohibits and the rights that all persons deserve. 4 ° Subsec-

tion (b) lists a number of establishments that qualify as places of public
accommodation, requiring them to treat all persons equally.41 For example, subsection (b)(1) of the Act identifies lodgings, and subsection (b)(2)
identifies restaurants.4 2
Subsection (b)(3) is Title II's broadest provision. 43 This provision provides that "other place[s] of exhibition or entertainment" are considered
a place of public accommodation within the scope of the Act.4 4 Subsection (b)(3) does not define what constitutes a place of entertainment.4 5

Courts have attempted to define places of entertainment but have grappled with subsection (b)(3)'s amorphous language.4 6 While the courts

Brian Daugherity, Recovering a "Lost" Story Using Oral History: The United States Supreme Court's Historic Green v. New Kent County, Virginia, Decision, ORAL HIST. REV.
June 22, 2006, at 25 (noting the cumulative effect of non-violent demonstrations, social
chaos, and pressure from President Lyndon B. Johnson on Congress).
36. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 572 (8th ed. 2004) (defining entertainment as something that provides
amusement).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).

38. See

DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW

212 (1972);

see

also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 286 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (recognizing Congress's basis for the Act under its Commerce Clause powers and
that Congress also properly used its Fourteenth Amendment authority to sanction racial
segregation).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
46. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306; see also Allen, 341 F.3d at 877 n.6, see also Miller, 394
F.2d at 350-51; contra Denny, 456 F.3d at 431 (restricting subsection (b)(3) to a narrow
interpretation).
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have played a central role in defining the Act's parameters under subsection (b)(3), their holdings have markedly differed.
C.

Court Interpretationsof the Public Accommodations Provision

Since Congress passed the Act more than forty years ago, courts have
not uniformly interpreted the places of entertainment provision.47 Some
courts define subsection (b)(3)'s scope by utilizing a narrow interpretation. 48 This approach limits the number of recognized public establishments. One district court, for example, restricted subsection (b)(3)'s
scope to exclude hair salons.49

Other courts have interpreted this provision broadly to protect many
establishments not explicitly named in subsection (b)(3)." For example,
the Fifth Circuit held that a women's health spa is a place of entertainment in Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health and Beauty, Inc.5 1 The Fifth
Circuit also held that
subsection (b)(3) covers amusement parks as places
52
of entertainment.
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has endorsed the more inclusive statutory interpretation of subsection (b)(3). 53 In Daniel v. Paul,
the Supreme Court held that subsection (b)(3) included a snack bar
within a private establishment. 54 The Court also noted that places of entertainment do not solely include places that attract spectators; this provision further includes places presenting alternate sources of
entertainment. In rejecting a narrow interpretation, the Court reasoned
that subsection (b)(3) calls for broader coverage.5 6
47. Compare Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306, and Allen, 341 F.3d at 878, and Rousseve, 516
F.2d at 67, and Miller, 394 F.2d at 350-51, with Denny, 456 F.3d at 431, and Halton., 94 F.
Supp. 2d at 863.
48. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431 (arguing that the Act's text does not expressly name
spas and therefore they are excluded from Title II); see also Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 863
(applying a narrow interpretation of subsection (b)(3)).
49. See Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
50. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305-08 (interpreting the Act as including a snack bar
within private establishment); see also Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 65 (holding that a women's
health spa is place of entertainment); see also United States v. DeRosier, 473 F.2d 749,
751-52 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying the Act to a tavern with jukebox and other entertainment
services); see also Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding a privately
owned recreational facility as place of entertainment); see also Miller, 394 F.2d at 344-45
(holding an amusement park to be place of entertainment).
51. 516 F.2d at 66.
52. See Miller, 394 F.2d at 344-45.
53. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307 (reasoning that broader interpretations are more faithful to Act's original purpose).
54. Id. at 305.
55. Id. at 305-306.
56. Id. at 307-08.
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In so holding, the Daniel Court used a dictionary to guide its analysis of
the phrase "place of entertainment."5 7 The Court defined places of entertainment as places existing for the purpose of "causing someone's time
to pass agreeably."5 8 As a result, the Court found that subsection (b)(3)
encompasses a wide range of establishments. 59
Additional Supreme Court precedent suggests that an inclusive reading
of the Act is appropriate because of its remedial nature. 60 A remedial
statute is one that aims to remedy certain social wrongs.61 In Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, the Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation
of the securities statute at issue would undermine its remedial purpose.62
The statute, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is a
general "catchall" provision granting remedies to defrauded purchasers
or sellers of stock.6 3 The Court rejected the argument that liability under
a similar statute excludes a remedy under section 10(b). 64 Noting that
Congress wrote section 10(b) to penalize the conduct at issue, the Court
found that restricting its application diminishes its curative effect.65 The
Court applied this inclusive approach in accordance with section 10(b)'s
broad remedial purpose of outlawing fraud in the market.6 6

57. Id. at 306 n.7.
58. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306 n.7 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL

Dic-

TIONARY 757).

59. Id.
60. Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983) (recognizing
repeated Supreme Court precedent construing remedial statutes flexibly); see Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968) (stating that courts should broadly interpret remedial statutes); see also Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 505 (1870) (noting that interpretations of
remedial statutes should consider harms preceding statute, remedies, goal, and legislative
intent that influenced Congress).
61. Benjamin V. Madison, III, RICO, JudicialActivism, and the Roots of Separationof
Powers, 43 BRANDEIs L.J. 29, 30 (2004) (noting statute prohibiting racketeering as correcting social wrongs).
62. 459 U.S. at 386-87; cf. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (reasoning that Title II's paramount purpose is to remove humiliation and indignities of discriminatory denials to places
seemingly open to general public); see Allen, 341 F.3d at 878 (applying Supreme Court's
inclusive interpretation of place of entertainment).
63. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 375; see Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No.
109-279, § 11, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006)) (creating
liability against certain individuals completing registration statement for material omissions or misstatements); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 109-279, § 10(b),
48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)) (outlawing any
fraudulent sales or purchases of stocks).
64. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 375.
65. Id.; see Daniel,395 U.S. at 307-08; see also Peyton, 391 U.S. at 65; see also Stewart,
78 U.S. at 505.
66. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 387.
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2007]

In sum, United States Supreme Court precedent supports an inclusive
reading of remedial statutes and of subsection (b)(3). 67 Some courts,
however, have adopted a narrow interpretation and limited Title II to
those places expressly listed in subsection (b). 68 The Fourth Circuit used
such an approach in Denny.69
III.

DENNY V. ELIZABETH ARDEN SALONS, INC.

In Denny, the issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether a spa is a
place of entertainment under subsection (b)(3). 7 ' Adopting a narrow interpretation of the Act, the Court held that a spa is not a place of entertainment. 71 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs'
discrimination claim.
A.

Factual and ProceduralBackground

Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. ("Arden") is an upscale beauty salon and
day spa that offers beauty services to the general public.7 2 One of the
plaintiffs purchased a spa package for her mother, which included a manicure, facial, massage, lunch, and hairstyle. 73 On the day of the appointment, Plaintiff called Arden to add a hair coloring and arranged to come
in to pay for it that day.7 4 When Plaintiff arrived, Arden's receptionist
refused to provide service and told her that there was a "problem" be75
cause Arden does not "do [B]lack people's hair.",
Among other causes of action, plaintiffs sued under Title II of the Act,
arguing that Arden qualifies as a place of entertainment under subsection

67. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08; but cf Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386-87
(recognizing need for flexible interpretations of remedial statutes); see also Peyton, 391
U.S. at 65 (holding that courts should broadly interpret remedial statutes); see also Stewart,
78 U.S. at 505 (noting that interpretations of remedial statutes should consider harms pre-

ceding statute, remedies, goal, and legislative intent that influenced Congress).

68. See generally Denny, 456 F.3d at 427 (holding that because Act does not mention

spas under subsection (b)(3) they are exempt); see also Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 856
(adopting narrow interpretation of subsection (b)(3)).
69. Denny, 456 F.3d at 427.
70. Id. at 434 (conceding that sufficient evidence established probability of racial discrimination under "viable" right to contract claim).
71. Id. at 427.
72. See Red Door Spas, http://www.reddoorspas.com/gc/location.asp (last visited July
31, 2007).
73. Denny, 456 F.3d at 430.
74. Id.
75. Id (quoting allegation that Arden's receptionist stated that Arden did not "do
black people's hair"). In contrast, Arden's manager recounted this differently and claimed
that the service plaintiff requested was on too short notice. Id.
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(b)(3).7 6 The district court entered summary judgment for Arden on all
counts.7 7 With respect to the Act, the court reasoned that Arden is not a
place of public accommodation because spas do not fall under subsection
(b)(3).7" On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 79
B.

Rationale

The Fourth Circuit concluded that beauty spas are not places of entertainment, and therefore not places of public accommodation.8 0 The
Denny Court reasoned that the Act's provision protecting places of entertainment is plain on its face and does not need further discussion."
According to the Court, a textual reading of the Act shows that a commercial day spa is not included as a place of entertainment.8 2
The Fourth Circuit insisted that Congress designed the Act in a calculating manner to include only those establishments the Act expressly
names.8 3 Moreover, the Court proclaimed that if Congress had intended
to include salons or spas as places of entertainment, it could have done so
easily.8 4 The Court also noted that beauty salons and barbershops 85
are so
common that Congress could not have overlooked their omission.
The Fourth Circuit also distinguished between the text of subsections
(b)(1)-(2) and subsection (b)(3) to underscore a pattern of exclusivity.86
These preceding subsections expressly list hotels, restaurants, and the
like.8 7 The Court asserted that Congress's decision to protect hotels and
restaurants in separate provisions reinforces a plain language interpretation of subsection (b)(3). 8 The Denny Court claimed that Congress

76. Plaintiff sued on three claims, including Title II, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Denny, 456 F.3d at 429. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 provides all people, regardless of race, the right to "make and enforce
contracts." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). This statute also guarantees
enjoyment and security of property and persons equally regardless of race. Id.
77. Denny, 456 F.3d at 429.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 492.
80. Id. at 433.
81. Id. at 431.
82. Denny, 456 F.3d at 433.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 434.
86. Id. at 432 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(2) (2006)).
87. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
88. Denny, 456 F.3d at 432 (concluding that Congress consciously omitted establishments that offer salon services).
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made a conscious decision not to cover spas like Arden and similar establishments when drafting the Act.8 9
Moreover, the Court methodically tried to reinforce a textual interpretation of
subsection (b)(3) by referring to the dictionary definition of
"place." 9 The dictionary defines "place" as a space "used for a particular purpose." 91 The Fourth Circuit synthesized this definition with the
word "entertainment" to define "place 92of entertainment" as a place
whose particular purpose is to entertain.
Having formulated a definition to support a textual argument, the
Court equated Arden with a maintenance service business. 93 The Court
cited Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., a district court case held that subsection
(b)(3) does not include hair salons as places of entertainment. 94 The
Denny Court likened Arden to the Great Clips hair salon, stating it was
just a business that offered maintenance services.9 5
Next, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, Inc. that determined subsection (b)(3) includes health spas.9 6 Like Arden, the Rousseve spa offered
beauty services to its clients, and the Denny Court accepted the holding
97
in Rousseve that women's health spas are places of entertainment.
However, the Denny Court distinguished the Rousseve facility by focusing on its recreational services, like fitness classes, which Arden did not
offer.9 8 The Fourth Circuit found Arden more similar to the hair salon in
Great Clips-a haircut business offering maintenance services-than the
spa in Rousseve.9 9 Finding that Arden was not a place of entertainment,
the Court concluded that the Act did not protect plaintiffs from Arden's
00
discriminatory practices.'

89. Id.
90. Id. at 431 (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1478 (2d ed. 1987) defining "place" as "a space ... used for a particular purpose").
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Denny, 456 F.3d at 431-32.
94. See id. at 433; see also Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (holding that hair salons are
not places of entertainment but instead are service businesses).
95. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 433.
96. Id.; see Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 65.
97. Denny, 456 F.3d at 433; see also Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 65.
98. Denny, 456 F.3d at 433 n.1.
99. Id.; see also Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 65.
100. Denny, 456 F.3d at 433 (noting that the Fourth Circuit accepted Rousseve's holding that a women's health spa is a place of entertainment despite its omission in the Act);
see Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 65.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit erred in finding that the spa at issue in Denny did
not qualify as a place of entertainment under subsection (b)(3). Specifically, the Court analyzed only half of subsection (b)(3)'s relevant language. The Denny Court also failed to take into account Supreme Court
precedent defining "place of entertainment." 10 1 Moreover, the Denny
Court ignored the Act's remedial nature and broad scope. Finally, the
Act's historical context and legislative intent reflect that Congress wrote
the Act to prohibit this kind of racial discrimination. Thus, the Supreme
Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit's holding in accordance with long
standing precedent and declare Arden a "place of public
accommodation."
A.

The Denny Court Improperly Defined "Place of Entertainment"

The Denny Court's reasoning in rejecting spas as places of entertainment is rife with error. The Court attempted to define "place of entertainment" using a dictionary.1" 2 However, the Court only defined
"place," and overlooked existing Supreme Court precedent defining
"entertainment." 10

3

The Court's definition of "place" was incomplete because it lacked a
corresponding definition of "entertainment.' 1 4 The dispute about
whether a spa is a "place of entertainment" turns on the meaning of "entertainment" and not solely on the meaning of "place., 1 0 5 The Denny
Court defined the meaning of "place" as being a space "set apart or used
for a particular purpose."'0 6 While the definition of "place" has some
relevance, it has a common sense meaning, and is not central to the entertainment aspect of subdivision (b)(3). 1°7 Moreover, the Denny Court
failed to use, or even mention, the definition of "entertainment" in its

101. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306 (using dictionary to define "entertainment").

102. Denny, 456 F.3d at 431.
103. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306; see also id. at 431 (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DicTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE,
at 1478) (defining "place" and not
"entertainment").
104. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (the language at issue in subsection (b)(3) is "place[s] of entertainment").
105. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see also Daniel, 395 U.S.
at 306 (focusing on meaning of "entertainment" in its analysis); but see Denny, 456 F.3d at
431 (focusing on meaning of "place" in its analysis).
106. Denny, 456 F.3d at 431 (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1478 (2d ed. 1987)).
107. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306 n.7 (defining "entertainment" but not discussing the
definition of "place").
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analysis. °8 Thus, the Denny Court's conclusion, by defining only half of
the provision in controversy, is inadequate.
The Denny Court also failed to apply Supreme Court precedent defining "entertainment."' 1 0 9 In Daniel v. Paul, the United States Supreme
Court defined entertainment as "the act of diverting, amusing, or causing
someone's time to pass agreeably.""'
Daniel interpreted subsection
(b)(3) as applying not only to businesses that attract spectators, but also
to those that offer other sources of entertainment.11 1
Had the Denny Court properly applied this Supreme Court precedent,
it would have concluded that Arden is a place of entertainment.' 12 Arden is a place with a particular purpose of making customers' time pass
pleasantly.' 13 Arden is not a mere hairstyling or maintenance business as
the Denny Court held, nor is Arden comparable to a barbershop. 4 By
failing to define the entire phrase "place of entertainment" or apply Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit erred in excluding Arden
from subsection (b)(3).
Opponents may argue that interpreting subsection (b)(3) to exclude
spas is fitting because spas are not similar to other recognized places of
entertainment. For example, some courts have recognized amusement
parks, snack bars, and taverns as places of entertainment.' 1 5 Spas are not
similar to amusement parks because spas are not equipped with enter108. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431-32.
109. Id. at 432 (rejecting argument limiting places of entertainment to places where
consumers are spectators or listeners). The Fourth Circuit rejected a broad interpretation
of subsection (b)(3) and dismissed Supreme Court precedent. Id. See generally Daniel,
395 U.S. 298 (noting that natural reading of subsection (b)(3) is not restrictive but instead
liberal and covers broad range of establishments); see also Allen, 341 F.3d at 870 (describing various activities other than spectator activities that qualified park as place of
entertainment).
110. 395 U.S. at 306 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
757) (defining "entertainment" as encompassing activities that cause "someone's time to
pass agreeably"); see also Allen, 341 F.3d at 877 n.6 (finding park where plaintiffs were
passing time agreeably was place of entertainment).
111. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306.
112. See id.
113. See id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 757) (defining "entertainment" according to dictionary meaning as "the act of diverting, amusing, or

causing someone's time to pass agreeably."); see also Denny, 456 F.3d at 439-40 (King, J.,
dissenting) (finding Arden's purpose was to entertain by amusing, providing recreation,
and pampering clients).
114. Denny, 456 F.3d at 433 (citing Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 862) (comparing Arden's
full service upscale spa to economy hair salon); see also Red Door Spas, http://www.red

doorspas.com/gc/location.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (advertising wide range of services).
115. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (finding snack bar to be place of entertainment);
see also DeRosier, 473 F.2d at 751-52 (holding that tavern with jukebox is place of entertainment); see also Scott, 421 F.2d at 143 (finding recreational facility to be place of
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taining roller coasters and other rides.1 16 Spas are also not similar to
snack bars or taverns, which offer other sources of entertainment.1 17 Because spas are not very similar to this group of recognized establishments,
spas are not places of entertainment. 18
This reasoning, however, is flawed because subsection (b)(3) protects
"other" places of entertainment rather than "similar" places of entertainment. 1 19 The fact that some courts have identified snack bars and taverns
as places of entertainment does not mean that spas are not places of entertainment.1 2 0 The Supreme Court's analysis in Daniel serves as additional evidence that the Act does not strictly protect "similar" places of
entertainment as named in subsection (b)(3). 12 1 The Fourth Circuit
Court's analysis was incomplete because it only defined "place" and
failed to consider the applicable Supreme Court precedent defining
"entertainment."
B.

Because the Act is a Remedial Statute, the Denny Court Should
Have Interpreted Subsection (b)(3) Broadly

In addition to conducting a deficient statutory analysis, the Fourth Circuit failed to apply a broad interpretation to the Act, a remedial statute.
The United States Supreme Court noted in Huddleston that it has consistently construed remedial statutes flexibly and not restrictively.12 2 The
Court also held in Daniel that a natural reading of subsection (b)(3) calls
for broad coverage.' 2 3 The Court acknowledged the social harms of raentertainment); see also Miller, 394 F.2d at 344-45 (holding amusement park to be place of
entertainment).
116. See generally Miller, 394 F.2d at 342 (recognizing amusement park as place of
public accommodation).
117. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (holding snack bar to be place of entertainment);
see also DeRosier, 473 F.2d at 751-52 (finding tavern to be place of entertainment).
118. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431-32 (characterizing spas as body maintenance businesses and not like places of entertainment).
119. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307
(rejecting inference that subsection (b)(3)'s scope only covers Congress's primary concerns); see also United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting narrow
construction of subsection (b)(3) that would alter provision to mean "similar" places of
entertainment).
120. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306 (defining entertainment broadly).
121. Id.
122. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386-87 ("A cumulative construction of the securities laws also furthers their broad remedial purposes. In enacting the 1934 Act, Congress stated that its purpose was to impose requirements necessary to make [securities]
regulation and control reasonably complete and effective.").
123. 395 U.S. at 307 ("[lIt does not follow that the scope of § 201 (b)(3) should be
restricted to the primary objects of Congress' concern when a natural reading of its language would call for broader coverage.").
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cial discrimination and the Act's purpose of reproaching those wrongs. 121
Recognizing that various remedial statutes redress these and similar injuries, the Court has rejected strict textual readings of such statutes. 125 To
hold otherwise would shrink the value of remedial statutes to superficial
levels and diminish their enforcement capacities.
This reasoning for a broad interpretation is particularly persuasive in
the context of racial discrimination. 126 During the Civil Rights Movement, people of color protested against the harms of long-standing subjugation and denials of equal access to public facilities. 127 Congress passed
the Act in response to the widespread civil rights agitation of the 1950s
and 1960s and under constitutional principles of equality. Serving a remedial purpose, the Act entitles all individuals to equal enjoyment of services and public facilities. 2 '
By interpreting Title II so as to deny plaintiffs relief for Arden's intentional racial discrimination, the Fourth Circuit ignored this remedial purpose. 129 The Court excluded all establishments that Title II does not
expressly list, thereby stifling the Act's broad remedial nature. 3 ° Moreover, despite acknowledging subsection (b)(3) as a "catchall" provision,
the Court nevertheless limited its scope. 13 1 In so holding, the Denny

124. Id.
125. Id. at 307-08 (preferring broader interpretation of Act and rejecting restrictive
reading as unnatural).
126. See Miller, 394 F.2d at 349 (reading subsection (b)(3) with "open minds" receptive to Act's overriding purpose to secure equal enjoyment of places of entertainment for
all citizens).
127. See Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul De Sac of Race Preference Disclosure, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1238-40 (2006).

128. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see also Daniel, 395 U.S.
at 307-08.
129. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431-32 (acknowledging Title II's anti-discrimination purpose in other places of entertainment); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(2006) (covering all hotels, inns, and other establishments that offer lodging to travelers
and exempting certain smaller accommodations where proprietor actually lives); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (protecting any lunchroom, restaurant,
and other establishment that primarily sells food to customers, including gas stations and
retail establishments that also serve food on premises).
130. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431-32 (acknowledging Title II's anti-discrimination purpose in other places of entertainment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (covering all hotels, inns, and other establishments that offer lodging to travelers and exempting certain
smaller accommodations where proprietor actually lives); see also 42 U.S.C. 2000a (protecting any lunchroom, restaurant, and other establishment that primarily sells food to customers, including gas stations and retail establishments that also serve food on premises).
131. See Denny, 465 F.3d at 431-32 (referring to subsection (b)(3) as a "catchall"
provision).
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Court erred by132
not applying Supreme Court precedent calling for a broad

interpretation.

Opponents would reject broad interpretations of the Act out of fear
that the Act's scope will exceed an already considerable list of protected
establishments. 3 3
The fact that Title II lists separate categories for protected establishments, however, does not mean that these lists are exhaustive. 134 Subsection (b)(3)'s broad language indicates that this list is illustrative rather
than exclusive.13 Congress did not have to name spas expressly because
subsection (b)(3) acts as a broader catchall provision.13 6 Moreover, Title
II cannot cover unlimited establishments because Congress already limited its scope to establishments listed in Title II, like places of
entertainment.1 37
In sum, rendering subsection (b)(3) as an exhaustive provision in defining the Act's parameters shrinks the list of targeted establishments, contrary to the Act's remedial nature. 13' Racial discrimination in particular
requires generous applications of remedial laws like the Act. Narrow interpretations that exclude qualifying public establishments undermine the
Act's original purpose of equality for all citizens.

132. See United States v. Tobeler, 311 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2002) (confirming that
subsection (b)(3) requires broad interpretation instead of narrow interpretation to effect
redress prescribed by Act).
133. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation,151
U. PA. L. REV. 1418, 1444 n.5 (2002) (noting opponents' interests in narrow constructions
of Act to counter "far-reaching effects"); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectiveson the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation,151 U. PA. L. REV. 1418, 1524-25 (2002) (describing opposition to Act as "super-statute" exceeding parameters Congress set in "four corners" of
statute).
134. See Allen, 341 F.3d at 878 (rejecting idea that subsection (b)(3) is exhaustive list
of places of entertainment); see also Miller, 394 F.2d 342 (rejecting narrow interpretations
of subsection (b)(3) because this provision includes establishments providing pleasurable
activities to customers).
135. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 873
(9th Cir. 2004) (describing importance of liberal interpretation of public accommodations
statutes because discrimination does not solely occur in categories of public accommodations as prescribed in remedial statutes).
136. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431 (referring to subsection (b)(3) as a "catchall"
provision).
137. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
138. See Miller, 394 F.2d at 349 (affirming Act's compatibility with liberal interpretations as firmly established under its purpose); cf Disabled Rights Action Comm., 375 F.3d
at 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that making discriminating agencies liable satisfies the
Americans with Disabilities Act's objective to entitle disabled persons equal access to
events they would have been excluded from previously).
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C. A Plain Interpretation of the Act Undermines CongressionalIntent
The Act engenders Fourteenth Amendment values of equality and outlaws separate treatment of non-Whites in places of public accommodation. 139 Refusing service for "Black people's hair" subordinates Black
women and is the precise type of discrimination targeted in the Act. 14 0
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision undermines Title II's primary objective of eliminating humiliation in this type of public establishment.1 4 1
1. Denny Involved Precisely the Type of Place the Act Covers and
the Type of Discrimination the Act Prohibits
Excluding consumers from enjoying and accessing commercial services
in spas on the basis of race subordinates people of color and diminishes
Title II's protections. 142 Arden overtly discriminated against Mrs. Denny
based on her hair type. 143 Hair type is a indistinguishable characteristic
1 44
and an immutable component of a Black person's racial identity.

139. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
140. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (showing that the Court considered congressional discussions covering Title II's breadth and Act's textual focus on establishments similar to
sporting and spectator arenas). However, the Court did not agree that the Act's scope is
limited to Congress's primary concerns. Id. Instead, the Court adopted a liberal interpretation of the Act considering the Act's overall purpose to eliminate daily indignities of
discrimination from seemingly public establishments. Id. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair
Piece: Perspectiveson the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 393 (1991).
141. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at
291-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 88-872, at 16 (1964), as reprintedin
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2369-70. (highlighting Act's primary purpose of eliminating personal indignities from unequal access to public establishments that segregationists denied
to people of color).
142. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 370 (1991) (noting that stigmatizing black women's hair
as inferior perpetuates socio-political and economic subordination of entire racial groups).
143. Denny, 456 F.3d at 435 (characterizing Arden's receptionist's explanation as
overt evidence of racial discrimination); cf Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 35
(2006) (describing widespread anti-Latino discrimination in south Texas and conduct pronouncing stigma of inferior status of Latinos, such as signs excluding Latinos from bathrooms and restaurants); see Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martfnez, Discriminationby
Proxy: The Case of Proposition227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 1227, 1228 (2000) (describing Proposition 227's attack on non-English speakers as
concealing racial discrimination with proxy of language as directly targeting Latinos).
144. See generally Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J.
1487, 1494 (2000) (recognizing that individuals constantly identify insignificant morphological differences as tools to delineate race and designate persons to particular racial groups);
see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 873 (2006)
(identifying popular notions and stereotypes of Black hair and features).
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Even the Fourth Circuit recognized that the plaintiffs produced strong
evidence of Arden's intent to discriminate. 145 The Court conceded that
Arden refused service on an overt racial basis, but it nonetheless failed to
give plaintiffs relief under the Act. 14 6 In so ruling, the Court disregarded
this as the precise form of degradation that the Act aims to remedy. 47
2.

The Fourth Circuit Disregarded Equal Protection Values

Denny undermines the Act's objective of protecting all persons
equally, irrespective of race. The Fourth Circuit's decision to exclude all
establishments not expressly named in the Act creates a loophole for future Equal Protection violations in protected establishments. 148 Thus, the
Denny decision actually helps perpetuate racial discrimination.
Additionally, Denny undermines equal protection by making arbitrary
distinctions between full service spas and other spas.14 9 The court acknowledged that the racial discrimination at issue in Rousseve-a spa
with similarities to Denny-violated the Act.15 ° Arden offers similar services as the Rousseve spa, such as body massages, facial treatments, and
more. 151 However, the Court rejected plaintiffs' claim that discrimination by spas is unlawful.1 52 The Fourth Circuit's contradictory interpretations compromise the Act's legitimacy. 153 In effect, the Fourth Circuit
created unequal protection hinging on the court's whimsical disposition.154 As a result, the Fourth Circuit's ahistorical ruling disregarded

145. Denny, 456 F.3d at 434.
146. See id. at 435.
147. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
148. See generally Miller, 394 F.2d 349 (considering the Act's history and concluding
that it aims to end racial discrimination in various establishments serving the general public

interpreting the Act broadly).
149. 456 F.3d at 433; see also Daniel,395 U.S. at 307-08 (recognizing that Act's "overriding purpose" was to diminish humiliation of racial discrimination from places seemingly
open to general public).
150. 456 F.3d at 433.
151. Compare id. and Red Door Spas, http://www.reddoorspas.com/gc/location.asp
(last visited July 20, 2007), with Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 67.
152. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 433.
153. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 291-92
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 88-872, at 16 (1964), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2369-70.) (highlighting Act's primary purpose of eliminating personal
indignities from unequal access to public establishments that segregationists denied to people of color).
154. Compare Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306 (rejecting strict textual reading of place of entertainment provision), and Allen, 341 F.3d at 878 (adopting Supreme Court's inclusive
interpretation of place of entertainment), and Rousseve, 516 F.2d at 67 (interpreting subsection (b)(3) liberally), and Miller, 394 F.2d at 350-51 (applying broad interpretation of
subsection (b)(3)), with Denny, 456 F.3d at 431 (confining subsection (b)(3) with narrow
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many years of hard-fought civil rights gains as it single-handedly reduced
plaintiffs' civil rights with their ruling.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit's decision in Denny diminished civil rights protections that entire generations fought to attain. 1 55 The Court ignored the
definition of "entertainment" and relevant United States Supreme Court
precedent necessary for a proper analysis of subsection (b)(3). The Court
should have read the Act in accordance with its remedial purpose of redressing the harms of discrimination that perpetuate inequality against
racial minorities. 156 Denny sets dangerous precedent and will cripple the
Act's civil rights protections. As a result, the United States Supreme
Court should grant certiorari, reverse the 15
Fourth
Circuit's decision in
7
Denny, and reaffirm pre-existing precedent.

interpretation), and Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (interpreting subsection (b)(3) narrowly).
155. Mark S. Weiner, The Semiotics of Civil Rights in Consumer Society: Race, Law,
and Food, 16 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 4, 395-405 (2003) (describing Act's role in ending

Jim Crow racial segregation and Supreme Court's decision in Katzenbach v. McClung upholding Act); see generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
156. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Gay Rights, Black Rights: Different Battle
but Similar Struggle, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 4138634 (describing treatment of African-Americans as America's "original sin" due to slavery, segregation, and subsequent harms).
157. See Daniel,395 U.S. at 307-08 (rejecting strict statutory interpretation of subsection (b)(3) and adopting flexible interpretation of Act to include establishments not expressly named); cf IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (describing forcefulness of stare
decisis in cases determining subject matter on which the United States Supreme Court has
previously ruled); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (noting that departure
from stare decisis requires extraordinary circumstances).
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